When was nato disbanded

As East Germany collapsed into disorganization, it became increasingly clear that the only way to stabilize the state was for West Germany to absorb the former communist territory.

The Soviet Union objected. In the initial meetings after the fall of the Berlin Wall, American leaders sought to appease Soviet concerns, offering to assure them that NATO forces would not expand eastward in Germany. These early offerings helped smooth the negotiations towards the reunification of Germany a year later.

Without NATO being able to operate in the east, that territory would be difficult to defend, and East German citizens would not accept less protection than their new German compatriots in the west received. Thus, the American position in the negotiation changed at a very early point, from assurances that NATO forces would not expand eastward in Germany, to requiring that East Germany be allowed to join NATO with few, if any, limitations.

Even though they were at first opposed to these terms, Soviet and East German officials did accept them. Thus, the final agreements, both bilateral between East and West Germany and multilateral between the other actors, recognized that the territory of East Germany would become a part of NATO. In return, the West agreed to a lenient timeline for the removal of Soviet forces and provided billions of dollars in aid to help redeploy and resettle these troops in Russia.

Perhaps more importantly, the final agreements also recognized that all of the states of Europe were free to choose which alliance, if any, to join. These states were struggling with the transition from communism to democracy, and saw NATO as a means to strengthen themselves politically and militarily, allowing room for economic development that would provide new prosperity and the possibility to join the burgeoning European Union.

They also saw NATO as a means to provide themselves with additional security from possible Russian aggression. It bears repeating that as NATO was trying to redefine itself in the post-Cold War environment, it was not looking to expand. Many of the original allies, including Britain and France, did not think expansion provided any advantage , views echoed by the American military.

But many American and Western officials, including President Bill Clinton below, left , came to see NATO enlargement as a useful means for ensuring political stability in an increasingly unstable Europe. For supporters of expansion, a larger NATO would provide security to democratizing countries, solidifying their transitions from communism and opening new economic prosperity through greater connections with the European Union, including potentially membership there. Critics of enlargement argued that the new members would not offer NATO much military or strategic benefit, and that those countries would be better served through other organizations, including the OSCE and EU.

NATO began evaluating candidates for military and political readiness. In , NATO judged that Poland , Hungary, and the Czech Republic met these criteria, but found that other countries like Slovakia needed more time to adjust their domestic politics to more liberal democratic norms.

Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the Stanton Foundation. Skip to main content. The Ohio State University. Department of History. Home Topics Africa. Middle East. North America. International Relations Religion Education Sports. Search form Search. Connecting History. Hot off the Press. History Talk. There is certainly evidence to support both perspectives. Disagreements over the future of Germany, the growing division of Europe, and increasing ideological competition created an adversarial relationship between the Soviets and the Western allies Enlargement of NATO, Marshall Plan aid package label.

Czechoslovakian communists staged a coup, South Korean refugees, North Atlantic Council coat of arms. The call should not be for "more" independence. We need full independence. We must go all the way, up to the termination of Nato. An alliance which should have wound up when the Soviet Union collapsed now serves almost entirely as a device for giving the US an unfair and unreciprocated droit de regard over European foreign policy.

As long as we are officially embedded as America's allies, the default option is that we have to support America and respect its "leadership". This makes it harder for European governments to break ranks, for fear of being attacked as disloyal. The default option should be that we, like they, have our interests. Sometimes they will coincide. Sometimes they will differ. But that is normal. In other parts of the world, a handful of countries have bilateral defence treaties with the US.

Some in Europe might want the same if Nato didn't exist. In contrast, a few members of the European Union who chose to take the considerable risk of staying neutral during the cold war - such as Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden - see no need to join Nato in the much safer world we live in today.

So it makes no sense that the largest and most powerful European states, those who are most able to defend themselves, should cling to outdated anxiety and the notion that their ultimate security depends on the US. Do we really need American nuclear weapons to protect us against terrorists or so-called rogue states? The last time Europe was in dire straits, as Nazi tanks swept across the continent in and , the US stayed on the sidelines until Pearl Harbor.

There is a school of thought which says that Nato is virtually defunct, so there is no need to worry about it. That view is sometimes heard even in Russia, where the so-called "realists" argue that Russia cannot oppose its old enemy, in spite of Washington's undisguised efforts to encircle it with bases in the Caucasus and central Asia.

The more Moscow tries, they say, the more it seems to justify US claims that Russia is expansionist - however odd that sounds, coming from a far more expansionist Washington.

It is true that Nato is unlikely ever again to function with the unanimity it showed during the cold war. The lesson from Iraq is that the alliance has become no more than a "coalition of the reluctant", with key members like France and Germany opting out of joint action.

But it is wrong to be complacent about Nato's alleged impotence or irrelevance. Nato gives the US a significant instrument for moral and political pressure. Tbilisi now builds units according to NATO standards so as to ensure interoperability in the future. Indeed, it has helped to re-create the very linear defence line it claims to have abandoned in the early s, but now further to the East.

In response to such allegations, NATO has held that its expansion to the former Warsaw Pact and its flirtation with the post-Soviet republics was never directed against Moscow, but merely an attempt to stabilise democratic transitions in these states.

Russia has never quite believed that version of events, reminding the alliance that its most powerful member state once gave Russia an informal promise that NATO would not expand eastwards. Unlike what some commentators have argued, we do not need more understanding for a nationalist, militarist and autocrat whose new Eastern Monroe doctrine is destabilising Eastern Europe while isolating his country.

This alliance is currently aiding a nationalist regime that did very little to diffuse its ethnic tensions in the aftermath of the Ukrainian revolution and that is now shelling its own citizens. The only reasonable response to the current crisis is a radical rethinking of European security that starts with the realisation that the continent has two problems: Russia and NATO. The West cannot disband Russia, but it can finally start a process that it should have started in the dissolution of its antiquated military alliance.

Perhaps it is important to remember that it was the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and not the West that called off the Cold War.